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Preserving Access to Tattoos: First Amendment
Trumps Municipal Ban in Anderson v. City of
Hermosa Beach
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision Anderson v. City of
Hermosa Beach,1 the court held that a municipal ban on tattoo
parlors violates the First Amendment. Particularly, the Ninth Circuit
diverged from the rulings of other jurisdictions to conclude that the
business, process, and nature of tattooing are purely expressive
activities entitled to robust First Amendment protection. After more
than thirty years of courts getting it wrong, the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion correctly reevaluates the purely expressive nature of
tattooing to conclude that tattoos are protected speech.
Nevertheless, while the Ninth Circuit’s decision aptly interpreted
First Amendment protection and precedent, it went too far when it
invalidated the Hermosa Beach ban as an unreasonable time, place,
or manner restriction.
Parts II and III of this Note examine relevant First Amendment
jurisprudence as well as the history and nature of tattoos generally.
Part IV of this Note addresses the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in
Anderson. Part V analyzes the Anderson decision in light of existing
case law and Supreme Court precedent, concluding that while the
court’s analysis of the tattooing process and business as “purely
expressive” speech is correct, it erred in concluding that the
Hermosa Beach ban is an unreasonable time, place, or manner
restriction. Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Johnny Anderson ran Yer Cheat’n Heart tattoo parlor in
Redondo Beach, within the City of Los Angeles. He wanted to open
another parlor in the City of Hermosa Beach.2 Hermosa Beach lies
within the County of Los Angeles, and while the City of Los Angeles

1. 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. Id. at 1055.
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generally permits tattoo establishments, Hermosa Beach does not.3
Hermosa Beach Municipal Code § 17.06.070 states: “Except as
provided in this title, no building shall be erected, reconstructed or
structurally altered, nor shall any building or land be used for any
purpose except as hereinafter specifically provided . . . .”4 The Code
subsequently permits several kinds of businesses, such as restaurants,
bars, and gun shops, but no provision in the zoning code allows
tattoo parlors.5
In August 2006, Anderson filed an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that § 17.06.070 was unconstitutional under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.6 The Central District of
California dismissed Anderson’s suit, alleging that it was not ripe for
review because he had not yet asked for permission to open a tattoo
parlor.7 Thereafter, Anderson requested to open a tattoo
establishment within Hermosa Beach under the city code’s provision
allowing establishments not specifically listed in the statute to
operate if the business could be classified as a “similar use.”8
Anderson’s request was denied by the city’s Community
Development Director, and in 2007 he reinitiated his action in
federal court to strike down the city’s ordinance.9
A. The District Court’s Ruling
Upon filing the case in district court, both parties moved for
summary judgment.10 The district court granted Hermosa Beach’s
motion and denied Anderson’s, holding that “the act of tattooing” is
not protected expression under the First Amendment because,
although it is non-verbal conduct expressive of an idea, it is not
‘sufficiently imbued with the elements of communication’”11 that are
required to receive First Amendment protection under Spence v.

3. Id. at 1056–57.
4. HERMOSA BEACH, CAL., MUNICIPAL. CODE § 17.06.070,
http://www.hermosabch.org/departments/cityclerk/code/1706.html#070.
5. Id. at § 17.06.030.
6. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1057.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1057–58.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).

132

available at

DO NOT DELETE

131

4/5/2011 7:57 PM

Preserving Access to Tattoos

Washington.12 Because the court did not consider tattooing
protected speech, mere rational basis review was required in order to
uphold Hermosa Beach’s ordinance.13 As such, in light of the
“health risks inherent in operating tattoo parlors,”14 Hermosa Beach
possessed a rational basis for excluding tattoo parlors, and thus the
ordinance stood. Anderson appealed the ruling to the Ninth
Circuit.15
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. First Amendment Protected Speech
The First Amendment, as incorporated and applied against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits government
restrictions on free speech.16 However, within this broad rule rest
several exceptions. Indeed, depending on the type of speech, First
Amendment protection may or may not apply. In the broad
continuum of speech, “pure” speech involves actual expressive
activity, such as writing a book or giving a public oration.17 Pure
speech is afforded the most protection under the Constitution.
Additionally, conduct that is not “pure” speech but has a
communicative aspect, such as burning a draft card, wearing an
armband, or distorting the American flag, generally also receives
some First Amendment protection.18
Nevertheless, even if speech is considered purely expressive in
itself, as opposed to conduct that communicates, such a finding does
not give the person a free pass to “speak” in all circumstances. For
instance, a city or jurisdiction may be able to regulate the time,
place, or manner of the speech, provided such a regulation is (1)
content-neutral, (2) in furtherance of a significant government
interest, (3) narrowly tailored, and (4) leaves open alternative
channels of communication of the information.19 Expressive conduct
12. 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
13. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1058.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. Beth Waldock Houck, Comment, Spinning the Wheel After Roulette: How (and
Why) to Overturn a Sidewalk Sitting Ban, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1451, 1469 (2000).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
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may also be regulated under the test promulgated in United States v.
O’Brien,20 which permits narrowly tailored regulation in light of an
“important or substantial government interest” that is unrelated to
the suppression of speech.21
While both pure speech and expressive conduct are considered
sacred under the First Amendment,22 and are at least presumptively
protected subject to the various tests listed above, other forms of
speech are not afforded similar protection. For instance, conduct that
is not “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,”23 or in
other words, conduct that does not obviously communicate an idea,
is not similarly exempted. Likewise, conduct that may have certain
harmful effects may be regulated even if the conduct is obviously
communicative in nature. For example, adult movie theaters24 and
nude dancing25 are considered “communicative” in nature but can
still be constitutionally regulated and banned in a number of areas.
B. The Tattoo: A Profession and an Art?
A tattoo is an image or word engrafted onto a person’s body.
Often termed “body art,” tattoos were first used as early as 5000
years ago.26 Later, tattoos became associated with two societal
groups: prisoners and members of the armed forces.27 Now, tattoos
have gained significant popularity with teenagers, celebrities, and
other broad groups within society. Indeed, in 1982 the Governor’s
Office of California issued a proclamation stating that “a tattoo is
primal parent of the visual arts . . . . It has reemerged as a fine art
attracting highly skilled and trained practitioners. Current creative

20. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
21. Id. at 377; see also Anderson v. City of Hemosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1059 n.3
(9th Cir. 2010).
22. As a corollary, there are of course certain types of “pure” speech which are given no
protection under the Constitution. These include perjury, libel, slander, infringing on
copyrights, and other forms of “fighting words.” See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
417 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (per curiam). However, since this presumptively
unprotected speech is not at issue with the creation of a tattoo, such a discussion does not
warrant much attention.
23. Spence, 418 U.S. at 409.
24. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
25. Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285 (2000).
26. Enid Schildkrout, Inscribing the Body, 33 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 319, 325
(2004).
27. David Morton, Tattooing, INVENTION & TECH., Winter 2002, at 36, 40.
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approaches . . . [infuse] this traditional discipline with new vigor and
meaning.”28 Most courts today recognize that a tattoo itself is
considered to be “pure” First Amendment speech.29
A tattoo is created through a surgical process by which dye is
injected “into the recipient’s skin by the use of needles or
machines.”30 Generally, an electronic tattoo machine is used to
create the tattoo, which commands a needle to puncture the skin.31
Ink is injected into the second layer of skin, and the result is
“essentially an open wound.”32 Because the process involves
puncturing skin and interaction with blood, there is a risk of
transmission of disease.33 As such, certain risks include infection,
tuberculosis, hepatitis B and C, and HIV.34 To guard against the
spread of disease, many states and cities have passed regulations to
monitor tattoo parlors and ensure that proper instruments and
cleaning measures are being employed.35
Of course, behind the tattoo is the tattoo artist. Tattoo artists
learn the trade through apprenticeships that allow them to learn the
art and work the machines. Tattoo artists typically work either in a
“tattoo parlor” or a “tattoo art studio.”36 A tattoo is ultimately
created through collaboration between the recipient and the tattoo
artist.37 Tattoo artists have been compared to painters, sculptors, and
other artists who are commissioned to produce a piece of art in
exchange for money.38

28. Hoag Levins, The Changing Cultural Status of the Tattoo Arts in America, TATTOO
ARTS IN AM., http://www.tattooartist.com/history.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
29. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1060 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“There appears to be little dispute that the tattoo itself is pure First Amendment ‘speech.’”).
30. Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (D. Minn. 1980).
31. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1055–56 (citing the city’s declaration).
32. Id.
33. See Body Art: Tattoos and Piercings, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/features/bodyart/ (last updated Jan. 21, 2008).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA, MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 4.05 (2010), available at
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=16299&stateId=15&stateName=Iowa.
36. See Levins, supra note 28.
37. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1057 (citing declaration submitted by Anderson
describing his own approach to tattooing).
38. Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual Property
Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 104 (2003).
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C. Tattoo Jurisprudence: Yurkew and Hold Fast Tattoo
Anderson is not the first case to raise the issue of tattoo parlors
and First Amendment jurisprudence. In fact, several courts have
already encountered the issue, in most cases finding that tattoo
parlors are generally not protected forms of speech under the First
Amendment.
Thirty years ago, in the seminal case of Yurkew v. Sinclair,39 a
Minnesota court considered whether the Minnesota State Fair Board
of Managers could refuse to rent space to a tattooist.40 The board
denied the rental space because of health and safety concerns
implicated in the tattooing process.41 The tattooist sued the
Minnesota State Fair, arguing that tattooing is protected First
Amendment speech and that the restriction was a prior restraint.42
The Minnesota court initially concluded that the process of tattooing
was expressive conduct rather than pure speech, and thus the main
question to decide was “whether the actual process of tattooing, as
opposed to the image conveyed by the tattoo itself, is sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication” as required under the
Spence test.43 The court ultimately found that the tattooing process is
not communicative in nature and thus does not implicate the First
Amendment.44
In so holding, the Yurkew court stated that the tattooist made
“no showing that the normal observer or even the recipient would
regard the process of injecting dye into a person’s skin through the
use of needles as communicative.”45 Under the Spence test,
communicative activity requires “[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message,”46 and that the circumstances surrounding
the conduct would likely provide “that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.”47 Because the surgical process
does not, in itself, communicate a message that the average observer
39. 495 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980).
40. Id. at 1249–50.
41. Id. at 1249.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1253 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1254.
46. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11.
47. Id. at 411.
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could interpret, the Minnesota district court rejected the tattooist’s
argument.48
More recently, in 2008, a U.S. district court in Illinois
encountered a similar question concerning a city’s denial of a tattoo
shop’s request for a special use permit. In Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v.
City of North Chicago49 a tattoo shop claimed that the denial of the
permit violated the First Amendment.50 Taking a page from Yurkew,
the court presumed that the process of tattooing was expressive
conduct, as opposed to pure speech, because “the act itself is not
intended to convey a particularized message.”51 Specifically, the
court compared the tattoo artist to a sound truck vehicle, in which
the vehicle allows a person to convey a message, but the truck itself is
not expressive.52 In sum, the court found that tattooing is not
protected speech under the First Amendment.53
Consistent with Yurkew and Hold Fast Tattoo, several other
courts have also found that tattooing is not protected under the First
Amendment. In Kennedy v. Hughes,54 the Delaware district court
concluded that operating a tattoo parlor does not involve a
“fundamental” right.55 In People v. O’Sullivan,56 the Supreme Court
of New York perfunctorily held that even if tattooing constituted
pure speech or symbolic speech, it may be subject to “reasonable
regulation in the public interest and [the] right to engage in
tattooing is not paramount to the public’s right to good health.”57
These decisions set the backdrop for the Ninth Circuit’s encounter
with Anderson and his tattoo parlor request.

48. Yurkew, 495 F. Supp. at 1254.
49. 580 F. Supp. 2d 656 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
50. Id. at 659.
51. Id. at 660 (refusing to engage in a dialogue about conduct versus pure speech and
stating that the “act of tattooing fails the first prong of this test because the act itself is not
intended to convey a particularized message”).
52. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992)) (describing a loud
sound truck as unprotected First Amendment speech).
53. Id.
54. 596 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Del. 1984).
55. Id. at 1493.
56. 409 N.Y.S.2d 332 (App. Div. 1978).
57. Id. at 333 (citations omitted).
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IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
In Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, the Ninth Circuit found
the provision banning tattoo parlors within the city in Hermosa
Beach’s Municipal Code § 17.06.070 facially unconstitutional.58
Significantly, the court concluded that because tattooing is purely
expressive activity, not expressive conduct, there is no need to
determine whether tattooing is “sufficiently imbued” with
communicative aspects as required under the Spence test.59
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit determined that an absolute ban on
tattoo parlors is not a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.60
A. Discarding the “Sufficiently Imbued” Test: Tattooing as Pure Speech
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis proceeded by rejecting the
underlying premise that had previously propelled the long line of
tattoo decisions. The court found that, as opposed to symbolic
conduct, such as burning a draft card, “tattooing is more akin to
traditional modes of expression (like writing).”61 Therefore, the
“sufficiently imbued” test is inapplicable because tattooing is purely
expressive speech.
The Ninth Circuit engaged in a three-step approach to
determine that the tattooing process is protected pure speech. The
reasoning went as follows: (1) tattoos are expressive, protected
speech; (2) speech includes the process of creating that speech; and
therefore, (3) the process of tattooing is necessarily protected speech.
First, the Ninth Circuit found that there is “little dispute” that
tattoos are considered expressive speech.62 The United States
Supreme Court has found various forms of entertainment to be
expressive activities, including dance, parades, movies, and music.63
Because tattoos consist of images, symbols, and words,64 there is
little difference between a tattoo and a painting.65 The Ninth Circuit
further explained that there is no difference between injecting dye

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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onto a piece of paper as opposed to in a person’s skin.66 Therefore,
because paintings and other forms of communication are protected,
tattoos should be protected as well.67
Second, when speech is protected, the medium of the speech is
likewise protected. Because “the process of expression through a
medium has never been thought so distinct from the expression
itself,”68 it would be contradictory to separate the process of creating
the expression, such as a printing press or artist brushes, from the
expression. Therefore, because the process of tattooing as performed
in a tattoo parlor constitutes the medium of expression, it is
protected under the broad umbrella of protected speech that
accompanies a tattoo.
B. Absolute Ban as a Time, Place or Manner Restriction
Next, the court found that an absolute ban on tattoo parlors in a
city is not a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.69 Even if
speech is protected, cities may limit the speech in their own
legitimate interests.70 However, the restriction must: (1) be contentneutral, (2) be narrowly tailored, and (3) leave open alternative
channels of communication.71
Here, the Ninth Circuit found that an absolute ban of all tattoo
parlors in Hermosa Beach was not narrowly tailored and did not
leave open alternative channels of communication.72 While the city
argued that the absolute ban was narrowly tailored—as Los Angeles
County lacks the resources to monitor the hundreds of tattooists
working there—the court rejected this reasoning by stating that the
city cannot use its own refusal to allocate resources as a means to
create a broad-based prohibition.73 Similarly, the court found that
alternative channels of communication are not available if tattoo
establishments are prohibited because a tattoo is a unique form of
communication that “often carries a message quite distinct from
displaying the same words or picture through some other
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1061–62.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1064–66.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1065.
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medium.”74 The court focused on the increasing popularity of
tattoos, citing a 2006 survey stating that 36% of people from ages
eighteen to twenty-five have tattoos, and 40% of people from ages
twenty-six to forty have tattoos.75 These numbers suggest that
tattoos are becoming an increasingly important and distinct form of
communication.76 For these reasons, the court found that the ban on
Hermosa Beach tattoo parlors was not a reasonable restriction.77
V. ANALYSIS
In light of prior decisions on the issue of tattoos and free speech,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anderson raises some interesting
questions. Jesse Choper, an expert on the First Amendment and a
law professor at the University of California, Berkeley, commented
that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Anderson constituted a “clear,
uncontroversial application of the First Amendment.”78 However,
while Choper believes that Anderson was a “pretty straightforward
case,”79 it is hard to comprehend how, if he is correct, nearly every
other court confronting the issue in the past thirty years got it
wrong.80 Indeed, this warrants further analysis into the Ninth
Circuit’s underlying premise and its inquiry into the art of tattooing
and free speech generally. Under this analysis, the Anderson court
correctly decided that tattooing should be considered purely
expressive First Amendment activity but erred in concluding that the
ban was not a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.

74. Id. at 1067 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 1066 (citing PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, HOW
YOUNG PEOPLE VIEW THEIR LIVES, FUTURES AND POLITICS: A PORTRAIT OF “GENERATION
NEXT” 21 (2007), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/300.pdf).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1064.
78. Paul Elias, Appeals Court Ends Tattoo Parlor Ban in Calif City, ABC NEWS (U.S.)
(Sept. 9, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=11595461.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of N. Chi., 580 F. Supp. 2d 656 (N.D. Ill.
2008); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980); State v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986); People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332 (App. Div. 1978); State v.
White, 560 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 2002); Blue Horseshoe Tattoo, V, Ltd. v. City of Norfolk, 72
Va. Cir. 388 (2007).
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A. Tattoos as a “Venerable Means of Communication”

After more than thirty years of conflicting decisions, the Ninth
Circuit finally turned the tide of tattoo jurisprudence by holding that
tattoos constitute a protected form of pure speech. Surprisingly, just
two years ago, a U.S. district court in Illinois concluded that tattoos
are not protected speech.81 This departure is significant, raising the
intriguing question: What has changed?
The answer: not much. The Ninth Circuit simply questioned the
underlying premise that several courts merely assumed was true—
that the tattooing process is distinct from the tattoo. Certainly this
distinction makes little sense. Courts have not separated the act of
painting from the finished product, or a printing press from the
newspaper product. The Supreme Court, in Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,82 declined to
make such a distinction when it held that a tax on newspaper ink
may improperly burden the dissemination of the newspaper.83
However, the previous tattoo-ban cases have deliberately segregated
the act of tattooing from the tattoo itself.
Perhaps one explanation for the shortcomings of other courts is
the emphasis on the health and safety concerns of tattooing. While
tattooing involves the transmission of blood, and possibly disease, no
such risk exists for a pen-and-ink drawing. However, as observed by
the Ninth Circuit judges during oral arguments in Anderson, a
painter may very well use lead ink in making a portrait, which could
cause lead poisoning, but the act of painting, as well as the painting
itself, is still protected speech.84
Similarly, the negative, transgressive qualities of tattoos may have
played a part in other courts’ refusals to accept the process of
tattooing as protected activity. Previously, tattoos were believed to
be a degraded art left to the “lower class.”85 Notably, however, the
Ninth Circuit went to great lengths to demonstrate tattoos’
increasing acceptance in traditional social circles and also explained

81. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
82. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
83. Id. at 592–93.
84. Oral Argument at 22:13, Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 (9th
Cir. 2010) (No. 08-56914), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.
php?pk_id=0000005493.
85. See Randolph I. Geare, Tattooing, SCI. AM., Sept. 12, 1903, at 189.
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how tattoos have “increased in prevalence and sophistication.”86
More significantly, the increasing social acceptance of tattoos
signifies that, as compared with thirty years ago, tattoos are now
perceived as “communicative” in nature. While in the past, body art
was generally understood as a barbaric practice received with
repugnance by mainstream culture, the Ninth Circuit entered into a
detailed description of how a tattoo makes a statement of “autonomy
and self-fashioning.”87 Therefore, while the First Amendment
jurisprudence on this issue seems to have remained relatively
unaltered in recent years, the perception surrounding tattoos as
speech seems to have changed.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s inquiry into the history and
communicative nature of tattooing reflects the U.S. Supreme Court’s
approach to First Amendment issues. Indeed, unlike the other courts
that have confronted tattoo parlor bans, the Ninth Circuit engaged
in an extensive discussion about the “decorative; religious; magical;
punitive”88 nature of tattoos. This analysis mirrors the Supreme
Court’s historical account in United States v. Stevens,89 in which the
Court engaged in an extensive discussion of the history of animal
cruelty to find that depictions of maiming and mutilation are not
likely protected under the First Amendment.90 While historical
evidence is not necessary for First Amendment protection, the Court
noted that the Constitution is not a document “prescribing limits,
and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.”91
Moreover, perhaps what occurred in Anderson that was absent
from the prior tattoo-parlor ban cases was that the court recognized
an amorphous line between pure speech and symbolic conduct.
Where a tattoo transforms from serving as merely a symbol of an idea
to become the very representation of the idea itself is a line that
courts should not have to draw. After all, such a determination
86. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1066.
87. Id. at 1067 (citing Susan Benson, Inscriptions of the Self: Reflections on Tattooing
and Piercing in Contemporary Euro-America, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY: THE TATTOO IN
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN HISTORY 251–52 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000)).
88. Id. at 1061 (citing Mark Gustafson, The Tattoo in the Later Roman Empire and
Beyond, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY, supra note 87, at 17).
89. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
90. Id. at 1585–86.
91. Id. at 1585 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch), 178 (1803)).
Note, however, that the statute in Stevens was ultimately held to be unconstitutional as it was
impermissibly overbroad. Id. at 1592.
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would change with each tattoo and every person who receives a
tattoo. For some, a navy anchor tattoo may represent service in the
military, but for others, the navy anchor may merely serve as a
decorative design, symbolizing nothing more than the anchor itself.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit recognized that for First Amendment cases
it is better to err on the side of permission than prohibition.92
B. Hermosa Beach’s Ban Is Reasonable in Los Angeles County
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit fell short in its analysis of
Hermosa Beach’s ban as an unreasonable time, place, or manner
restriction. After accepting tattooing as expressive activity, the court
proceeded to invalidate the ordinance on two grounds: that the ban
was not narrowly tailored, and that it did not leave open alternative
channels of communication.93 Specifically, the court focused on the
fact that as a general proposition, absolute bans are disfavored in
First Amendment case law.94 While this may be true, this broad
proposition should not apply to the 1.5 square miles comprising
Hermosa Beach.
1. Narrowly tailored
In order for a time, place, or manner restriction to be upheld on
free speech grounds, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest.95 Anderson did not dispute that the
health and safety concerns of tattooing serve a government interest.
Rather, Anderson claimed, and the court agreed, that tattooing can
be conducted safely, and that the failure of the city to appropriate
the proper number of health inspectors cannot be a means to restrict
free speech.96
The problem with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis is that while
tattooing may be conducted safely in some circumstances, tattooing
presents other risk factors that can lead to crime and drug use. For
instance, tattooing presents specific risk factors for adolescents and
92. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 474 (2007)
(“Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.”).
93. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1068.
94. Id. at 1064.
95. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) (“[A]s is true of
other ordinances, when a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly
drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government interest.”).
96. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1065.
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teens, for whom tattoos have generally been found to accompany
“low self-esteem, delinquency, [and] drug abuse.”97 Moreover, while
health regulations often address the use of sterile equipment, diseases
may be transferred through the ink or the string that is used to
transmit the ink.98 Furthermore, what distinguishes tattooing from
other potentially infection-creating trades, such as nail salons and
barber shops, is that tattooing is closely associated with the drug
culture and transmission of HIV and hepatitis.99 In other forms of
problematic speech, like live entertainment and hand billing, the
government is concerned about litter, parking, and neighborhood
deterioration.100 Risks associated with tattooing are certainly more
immediate and hazardous than those of littering and parking.
Similarly, while the Ninth Circuit alleged that health and safety
regulations are a narrowly tailored means to confront the risks of
tattooing as opposed to an outright ban, there is no information
suggesting that such regulations improve the problem areas of
tattooing. For instance, unreported or unlicensed tattoo artists
operating in basements and homes are unlikely to be affected by
health regulations. Indeed, in a Minnesota study on the relationship
between government regulation and tattooists’ response to such
regulation, artists who self-reported responded favorably to
government regulation, but problem areas still existed with artists
who did not report.101 In fact, “tattooists most in need of
improvement [from government regulation] may be hardest to reach
due to their opposition to the government.”102 This difficulty is in
keeping with the culture of the tattoo industry, which has often been
resistant to government involvement.103

97. Ronald L. Braithwaite et al., Risks Associated with Tattooing and Body Piercing, 20 J.
PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 459, 459 (1999).
98. Id. at 461.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Schad, 452 U.S. at 73 (relating that the ban on live entertainment is
arguably based on issues related to “parking, trash, police protection, and medical facilities”).
101. Monica J. Raymond, Linda L. Halcón & Phyllis L. Pirie, Regulation of Tattooing in
Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota: Tattooists’ Attitudes and Relationship Between Regulation
and Practice, 188 PUB. HEALTH REP. 154, 160 (2003).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 159 tbl.3 (detailing widely varying opinions among tattooists as to proper
extent of government regulation, including restrictions on purchasing tattooing equipment,
giving tattoos to minors, and involvement of persons with bloodborne illnesses).
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2. Alternative channels of communication
The court proceeded to conclude that an absolute ban on tattoo
parlors would not leave open alternative channels of communication
to those who desired a tattoo. The Ninth Circuit focused on the
Supreme Court’s general disfavor of broad prophylactic prohibitions
on speech. Citing cases such as City of Ladue v. Gilleo104 and Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim,105 the court concluded that as a rule,
absolute bans are rejected.106 However, the court’s analysis was
flawed: the regulations in Ladue and Schad were not struck down
because they were blanket prohibitions per se, but because the
nature of the speech conformed to the surrounding area107 and the
government interest did not outweigh the First Amendment
rights.108 Indeed, in Schad, the Supreme Court invalidated a
municipal ordinance that prohibited all nude dancing in the city, but
the Court held that the “[t]he situation would be quite different if
the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting
access to, lawful speech.”109 The Schad Court observed that there
was no evidence in the record that the kind of dancing that was
prohibited by the ordinance was available in close-by areas outside of
the city.110
Here, what the court failed to mention, and what was incorrectly
stated in the oral arguments by Anderson’s counsel, is that Los
Angeles County, of which Hermosa Beach is only a small part,
generally allows tattoo parlors subject to licensing requirements.111
Indeed, Anderson’s other tattoo parlor is located in the town of
Gardena,112 only eight miles away from Hermosa Beach.113 While the

104. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
105. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
106. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 2010).
107. Schad, 452 U.S. at 76.
108. Id. at 72; Ladue, 512 U.S. at 54.
109. Schad, 452 U.S. at 76 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71
n.35 (1976)).
110. Id.
111. See LOS ANGELES CNTY. CODE § 7.94.020(A) (2010), available at
http://search.municode.com/html/16274/index.htm (“No person shall own or operate a
body art establishment or permit the conduct of body art activity at any location unless and
until a body art establishment license has been procured . . . .”).
112. See Elias, supra note 78.
113. Driving Directions from Hermosa Beach, CA to Yer Cheat’n Heart Tattoo,
Gardena, CA, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Get Directions” hyperlink;

145

DO NOT DELETE

4/5/2011 7:57 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2011

court may have been correct in determining that a large-scale time,
place, or manner restriction in all of Los Angeles County may be
overly broad, certainly this is not the case in the present action. The
Hermosa Beach ban merely restricted access to tattoos in Hermosa
Beach, not all access; as residents would only need to travel five
minutes, or walk ten blocks, to a neighboring city to find a tattoo
artist.114
Unfortunately, the court was so committed to invalidating the
tattoo parlor ban that it failed to consider the city’s location and its
place in the larger community of Los Angeles. Contrary to the Ninth
Circuit’s characterization, a prohibition in Hermosa Beach would
not foreclose all opportunities for obtaining a tattoo in tattoo parlors
in Los Angeles County.
Finally, the court engaged in a discussion of how tattoos are a
“distinct” method of communication carrying a unique message.115
This analysis misses the mark. The Hermosa Beach time, place, or
manner restriction bans tattoo parlors, not tattoos. Determining the
validity of a time, place, or manner restriction is an inquiry apart
116
from the pure speech versus conduct dichotomy discussed earlier.
In the latter, the tattoo and the tattoo process are necessarily
intertwined. But for the former, regulations restricting the manner of
expression are not the same as restricting the expression itself. The
court engages in an analysis assuming that regulation of the
tattooing process is the same as limiting tattoos entirely. As
mentioned earlier, this is not the case. Hermosa Beach does not ban
tattoos, merely tattoo parlors. Certainly a ban in a city with limited
space and neighboring cities that permit tattoo parlors is not
unreasonable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach is a landmark decision in
several respects. Finally, after more than thirty years, tattoo parlors
are recognized as a protected medium of pure speech, not conduct.
then search “A” for “Hermosa Beach, CA” and search “B” for “Yer Cheat’n Heart Tattoo,
Gardena, CA”; then follow “Get Directions” hyperlink).
114. See
Tattoo
Parlors
in
Redondo
Beach,
CA,
GOOGLE
MAPS,
http://maps.google.com (search for “tattoo parlors”; then zoom in on Redondo Beach, CA)
(showing two tattoo parlors in Torrance and one in Gardena).
115. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2010).
116. See supra Part IV.A.
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The Ninth Circuit’s articulation of tattooing as a protected form of
communication effectively closed the door to years of dispute.
However, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider Hermosa Beach’s
specific circumstances in concluding that the restriction was an
invalid time, place, or manner restriction. Indeed, it appeared that
the court was so concerned with making a statement about the
impropriety of such tattoo prohibitions that it failed to analyze the
realities of Hermosa Beach. While tattoo parlors should be protected
under the First Amendment, they should still be capable of being
regulated under proper time, place, or manner restrictions.
Richard Hyde

 J.D. Candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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